Modal realism, counterpart theory, and the possibility of multiversal rectitude

Analysis 71 (4):680-684 (2011)
Jim Stone has argued that a multiversal version of Modal Realism together with Counterpart Theory cannot account for a certain intuitive possibility. Roughly, it is the possibility that all free moral choices of a certain sort are the right choices in all cases in the multiverse. The present work offers an explanation of how the metaphysics in question can account for the intuitive possibility in question
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