No lacuna and no vicious regress: A reply to le poidevin [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 23 (4):367-372 (2008)
In his “Space, supervenience and substantivalism”, Le Poidevin proposes a substantivalism in which space is discrete, implying that there are unmediated spatial relations between neighboring primitive points. This proposition is motivated by his concern that relationism suffers from an explanatory lacuna and that substantivalism gives rise to a vicious regress. Le Poidevin implicitly requires that the relationist be committed to the “only x and y ” principle regarding spatial relations. It is not obvious that the relationist is committed to this principle in such a context. An additional motivation for Le Poidevin's argument, that space should be considered to be discrete, is that he believes that substantivalists are committed to a vicious regress. I show that the regress is in fact not of the vicious variety. These two main arguments show that Le Poidevin's suggestion that we drop the density postulate for space is unnecessary.
|Keywords||substantivalism relationism Le Poidevin vicious regress explanatory lacuna only x and y principle|
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References found in this work BETA
Bertrand Russell (1903). Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge University Press.
P. T. Geach (1972). Logic Matters. Oxford,Blackwell.
Peter Klein (2003). When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.
Carl Gillett (2003). Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709–717.
Citations of this work BETA
Claudio Mazzola (forthcoming). Still Foes: Benovsky on Relationism and Substantivalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-14.
Claudio Mazzola (2016). Still Foes: Benovsky on Relationism and Substantivalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):247-260.
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