No lacuna and no vicious regress: A reply to le poidevin [Book Review]

Acta Analytica 23 (4):367-372 (2008)
In his “Space, supervenience and substantivalism”, Le Poidevin proposes a substantivalism in which space is discrete, implying that there are unmediated spatial relations between neighboring primitive points. This proposition is motivated by his concern that relationism suffers from an explanatory lacuna and that substantivalism gives rise to a vicious regress. Le Poidevin implicitly requires that the relationist be committed to the “only x and y ” principle regarding spatial relations. It is not obvious that the relationist is committed to this principle in such a context. An additional motivation for Le Poidevin's argument, that space should be considered to be discrete, is that he believes that substantivalists are committed to a vicious regress. I show that the regress is in fact not of the vicious variety. These two main arguments show that Le Poidevin's suggestion that we drop the density postulate for space is unnecessary.
Keywords substantivalism  relationism  Le Poidevin  vicious regress  explanatory lacuna  only x and y principle
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-008-0037-x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Christina Conroy, No lacuna and no vicious regress: A reply to le poidevin
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Peter Klein (2003). When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.
Carl Gillett (2003). Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709–717.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Claudio Mazzola (2016). Still Foes: Benovsky on Relationism and Substantivalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):247-260.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

184 ( #21,401 of 1,940,955 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

30 ( #16,648 of 1,940,955 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.