Naïve realism, adverbialism and perceptual error

Acta Analytica 23 (2):147-159 (2008)
Abstract
My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to (a) a relational view of experience and (b) a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that acceptance of (a) is independent of acceptance of (b). I then present a modified adverbialism that presents experience as relational in nature but whose character is nevertheless to be explained in terms of the way in which one senses an object. Finally, I will offer an explanation of how a naïve realist about experience can adopt this modified adverbialism and in so doing accommodate the possibility of perceptual error.
Keywords Perception  Adverbialism  Naïve realism  The relational view of experience  Illusion
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References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1999). Back to the Theory of Appearing. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):181--203.
Bill Brewer (2008). How to Account for Illusion. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 168-180.
Curt John Ducasse (1951). Nature, Mind, and Death. La Salle, Ill.,Open Court Pub. Co..

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