Naïve realism and extreme disjunctivism

Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):201-221 (2011)
Abstract
Disjunctivism about sensory experience is frequently put forward in defence of a particular conception of perception and perceptual experience known as naïve realism. In this paper I present an argument against naïve realism that proceeds through a rejection of disjunctivism. If the naïve realist must also be a disjunctivist about the phenomenal nature of experience, then naïve realism should be abandoned.
Keywords Perception  Naive Realism  Disjunctivism
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    References found in this work BETA
    Jonathan Dancy (1995). Arguments From Illusion. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):421-438.
    H. P. Grice (1988). The Causal Theory of Perception. In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Mark Johnston (2004). The Obscure Object of Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.

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