Opposing Skepticism Disjunctively

Abstract

Disjunctivists hold that perceiving external objects is fundamentally different from any experiential state that is not a perception. In fact, roughly speaking, disjunctivists say that they have nothing in common. Suppose that it appears to someone as though she perceives something. Disjunctivists say that there are two disparate sorts of facts that could make this true. Either she is genuinely perceiving something, or she is in an experiential state of merely apparent perception. An apparent perception is fundamentally unlike a perception. Disjunctivists differ in what they say the fundamental difference is. We’ll get to some of that shortly. First I’ll say where I’m headed here

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Earl Conee
University of Rochester

Citations of this work

Epistemological disjunctivism and the basis problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):434-455.

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