David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Episteme 6 (3):313-323 (2009)
Experts take sides in standing scholarly disagreements. They rely on the epistemic reasons favorable to their side to justify their position. It is argued here that no position actually has an overall balance of undefeated reasons in its favor. Candidates for such reasons include the objective strength of the rational support for one side, the special force of details in the case for one side, and a summary impression of truth. All such factors fail to justify any position.
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References found in this work BETA
Earl Conee (2010). Rational Disagreement Defended. In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. OUP Oxford
Citations of this work BETA
J. Adam Carter (2013). Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision. Erkenntnis 1 (S1):1-18.
Kirk Lougheed & Robert Mark Simpson (forthcoming). Indirect Epistemic Reasons and Religious Belief. Religious Studies:1-19.
Jonathan Matheson (2016). Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement. Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):120-141.
Ben Sherman (2015). Unconfirmed Peers and Spinelessness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):425-444.
Gurpreet Rattan (2014). Disagreement and the First‐Person Perspective. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):31-53.
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