Stich and Nisbett on justifying inference rules
Philosophy of Science 50 (2):326-331 (1983)
| Abstract | Stich and Nisbett offer an analysis of the concept of a justified inference rule, building upon the efforts of Goodman. They fault Goodman's view on the grounds that it is incompatible with some recent psychological research on reasoning. We criticize their proposal by arguing that it is subject to much the same objections as those they raise against other accounts | |||||||||
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Ken Akiba (1996). Logic as Instrument: The Millian View on the Role of Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 17 (1-2):73-83.
V. V. Rybakov, M. Terziler & C. Gencer (2000). On Self-Admissible Quasi-Characterizing Inference Rules. Studia Logica 65 (3):417-428.
Stephen P. Stich (1982). Beyond Inference in Perception. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:553 - 560.
Richard E. Nisbett (ed.) (1993). Rules for Reasoning. L. Erlbaum Associates.
Christopher Gauker (1999). Deflationism and Logic. Facta Philosophica (1):167-199.
Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross (1980). Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Prentice-Hall.
Stephen P. Stich & Richard E. Nisbett (1980). Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning. Philosophy of Science 47 (2):188-202.
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