David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum Press. 120--137 (2011)
My two daughters would love to go tobogganing down the hill by themselves, but they are just toddlers and I am an apprehensive parent, so, before letting them do so, I want to ensure that the toboggan won’t go too fast. But how fast will it go? One way to try to answer this question would be to tackle the problem head on. Since my daughters and their toboggan are initially at rest, according to classical mechanics, their final velocity will be determined by the forces they will be subjected to between the moment the toboggan will be released at the top of the hill and the moment it will reach its highest speed. The problem is that, throughout their downhill journey, my daughters and the toboggan will be subjected to an incredibly large number of forces—from the gravitational pull of any massive object in the universe to the weight of the snowflake that is sitting on the tip of one of my youngest daughter’s hairs—so that any attempt to apply the theory directly to the real-world system in all its complexity seems to be doomed to failure
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
S. Ducheyne (2008). Towards an Ontology of Scientific Models. Metaphysica 9 (1):119-127.
Craig Callender & Jonathan Cohen (2006). There is No Special Problem About Scientific Representation. Theoria 21 (1):67-85.
William F. Brewer (2001). Models in Science and Mental Models in Scientists and Nonscientists. Mind and Society 2 (2):33-48.
Ronald Giere (2010). An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scientific Representation. Synthese 172 (2):269–281.
Roman Frigg (2006). Scientific Representation and the Semantic View of Theories. Theoria 21 (1):49-65.
Gabriele Contessa (2010). Scientific Models and Fictional Objects. Synthese 172 (2):215 - 229.
Gabriele Contessa (2007). Representing Reality: The Ontology of Scientific Models and Their Representational Function. Dissertation, University of London
Adam Toon (2010). Models as Make-Believe. In Roman Frigg & Matthew Hunter (eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science. Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science.
Added to index2009-07-17
Total downloads364 ( #669 of 1,102,812 )
Recent downloads (6 months)26 ( #5,492 of 1,102,812 )
How can I increase my downloads?