David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Why worry about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus? Did not Wittgenstein himself come to think it was largely a mistaken work? Is not Wittgenstein’s important work his later work? And does not his later work consist in a rejection of his earlier views? So does not the interest of the Tractatus mostly lie in its capacity to furnish a particularly vivid exemplar of the sort of philosophy that the mature Wittgenstein was most concerned to reject? So is it not true that the only real reason to worry about the Tractatus is to become clear about what sort of thing it was that the later Wittgenstein was most against in philosophy? Is the interest of the book therefore not largely exhausted by its capacity to show us what the later Wittgenstein did not think? Much of the secondary literature on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, either implicitly or explicitly, answers these questions largely in the affirmative. The aim of this paper is to suggest that the manner in which it has done so has done much to obstruct the possibility of an understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy – both early and late. The aim is not to suggest that these questions should be answered instead in the negative, but rather to furnish a prolegomenon to the possibility of a proper understanding of what – and how much – ought to be affirmed in answering them in the affirmative. As the present volume makes evident, there is currently a debate underway about how to read (and how not to read) Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. This paper will not attempt a direct contribution to that debate,2 it will attempt instead to bring out some of what might be at stake in that debate. It is natural to think that all that ought to be at stake is a fairly parochial question concerning the proper interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work during a single, relatively early phase of his philosophical development. Thus it is natural to conclude that, whatever differences may divide the parties to this debate concerning how to read the Tractatus, nonetheless, au fond these interpreters of Wittgenstein may be in broad agreement about how to read most of the rest of Wittgenstein’s work – or, at least, whatever their disagreements may be about the early work, they are ones that can be independently adjudicated, without substantial cost to anyone’s prior....
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
James Conant & Cora Diamond (2004). On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely: Reply to Meredith Williams and Peter Sullivan. In Max Kölbel & Bernhard Weiss (eds.), Wittgenstein's lasting significance. Routledge.
Laurence Goldstein (2002). How Original a Work is the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus? Philosophy 77 (3):421-446.
Marie McGinn (2006/2009). Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Logic and Language. Oxford University Press.
Anton Alterman (2001). The New Wittgenstein (Review). [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (3):456-457.
Derek A. McDougall, BRITISH WITTGENSTEIN SOCIETY BOOK REVIEWS. WITTGENSTEIN BOOK REVIEWS.
Nikolay Milkov (2003). The Method of the Tractatus. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 11:139-41.
Edmund Dain (2006). Contextualism and Nonsense in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):91-101.
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2003). Contentless Syntax, Ineffable Semantics and Transcendental Ontology. Reflections on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Kriterion 17:1-6.
E. D. Klemke (1971). Essays on Wittgenstein. Urbana,University of Illinois Press.
Alfred Nordmann (2005). Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.
Bruce Howes (2007). "Rethinking" the Preface of the Tractatus. Philosophical Investigations 30 (1):3–24.
Giorgio Lando (2011). Assertion and Affirmation in the Early Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein Studien 2 (1):21-47.
Peter M. Sullivan (2004). ‘The General Propositional Form is a Variable’ (Tractatus 4.53). Mind 113 (449):43-56.
Colin Johnston (2007). Symbols in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):367-394.
Dawn M. Phillips (2006). Clear as Mud. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:277-294.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads53 ( #25,201 of 1,088,810 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #24,252 of 1,088,810 )
How can I increase my downloads?