David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 38 (4):733-740 (2010)
In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, the proposal runs headlong into the now familiar “bootstrapping” objection that helped illuminate the need to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the first place. Lastly, even if Southwood is right—the demands of rationality just are the demands or our first-personal standpoints—the explanation as to why our standpoints generate reasons will entail that we sometimes have no reason at all to be rational.
|Keywords||Rationality Normativity Practical Reason Normative Reasons Boot-strapping Broome Kolodny Authority|
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References found in this work BETA
Elizabeth Anderson (1993). Value in Ethics and Economics. Harvard University Press.
John Broome (1999). Normative Requirements. Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
John Broome (2008). Reply to Southwood, Kearns and Star, and Cullity. Ethics 119 (1):96-108.
Stephen L. Darwall (2002). Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton University Press.
David Enoch (2006). Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come From What is Constitutive of Action. Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.
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