David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 155 (1):83–98 (2011)
I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: x-ing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain why the following conditional-type is true: If x-ing would be morally required, if anything is, then x-ing is actually morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive moral claim; I use only plausible claims that most moral skeptics and error theorists can and do accept. The final section diagnoses why my arguments work. Here, I offer an explanation for the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral that may help those worried that the strategy is a sophisticated trick. I conclude by considering two objections. In replying to these objections, I explain why the strategy may allow us to demonstrate more than “obvious” moral truths, and why it may also address a stronger version of error theory, according to which, moral truths are not possible.
|Keywords||Error Theory Moral Realism Moral Skepticism Moral Epistemology Nihilism Normative Ethics Moral Supervenience Mackie Joyce Korsgaard|
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References found in this work BETA
Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
Simon W. Blackburn (1984). Supervenience Revisited. In Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge University Press. 59--74.
David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Terence Cuneo (2006). Moral Facts as Configuring Causes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):141–162.
Citations of this work BETA
Philip Brown (2013). The Possibility of Morality. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):627-636.
David Faraci (2013). Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox. Philosophia 41 (3):751-755.
Garry Young (2014). A Meta-Ethical Approach to Single-Player Gamespace: Introducing Constructive Ecumenical Expressivism as a Means of Explaining Why Moral Consensus is Not Forthcoming. Ethics and Information Technology 16 (2):91-102.
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