Paradox lost: Understanding vague predicates

Abstract The paper is concerned with the status of vague predicates. It is argued that they are for the most part ?classifiers?, which are covertly comparatives and name not monadic properties but relations. The Sorites Paradox, it is claimed, is thus defused and a verdict theory of vague predicates is presented. Our practice in using vague words is described and it is contended that in our use of these predicates we always have a permanent possibility of independent demarcation. Wittgenstein's picture of the wall and the swamp is deployed to avoid the Transition Problem and it is argued against Fregeans that we need vague language for the advancement of knowledge and understanding
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DOI 10.1080/09672559508570813
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References found in this work BETA
Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Blindspots. Oxford University Press.

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