Online research in philosophy

This paper is about two kinds of mental content and how they are related. We are going to call them representation and indication. We will begin with a rough characterization of each. The differences, and why they matter, will, hopefully, become clearer as the paper proceeds.

This is the first book-length study of two of Descartes's most innovative successors, Robert Desgabets and Pierre-Sylvain Regis, and of their highly original contributions to Cartesianism. The focus of the book is an analysis of radical doctrines in the work of these thinkers that derive from arguments in Descartes: on the creation of eternal truths, on the intentionality of ideas, and on the soul-body union. As well as relating their work to that of fellow Cartesians such as Malebranche and Arnauld, the book also establishes the important though neglected role played by Desgabets and Regis in the theologically and politically charged reception of Descartes in early-modern France. This is a major contribution to the history of Cartesianism that will be of special interest to historians of early-modern philosophy and historians of ideas.

Abstract   Are we to get rid with representation after all? Since World War II, political philosophy seems to have devoted itself to either the intellectual sabotage of representation, or its defence against all evidence. Nobody seems to have thought that the problem with political representation might be the fact that the way it was thought was by no means correct. Considered as a fundamental principle of Western democracies, it might be at the very level of what a principle implies that representation must be reloaded. For instance, by admitting that as a principle representation is not something that precedes what for which it provides ground (the government, the State, etc.)—but something that follows, that constitutes the final product of representation itself. Content Type Journal Article Category Commentary Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s10699-011-9269-0 Authors Laurent de Sutter, Brussels, Belgium Journal Foundations of Science Online ISSN 1572-8471 Print ISSN 1233-1821.

A long tradition regards Robert Desgabets as a Cartesian empiricist. He says things that sound strikingly like Locke, and he argues against anti-empiricist reasoning in Descartes, Malebranche, and Arnauld. Moreover, throughout his writings he endorses the empiricist principle that nothing is in the intellect except what was previously in the senses. Since the Cartesians are generally supposed to be prototypical non -empiricists, Desgabets’s being a Cartesian empiricist would make him a particularly interesting specimen. In this paper, however, I challenge the case for taking Desgabets to be an empiricist.