Philosophy of Science 63 (3):35 (1996)
|Abstract||Recent controversy over the existence of biological laws raises questions about the cognitive aims of theoretical modeling in that science. If there are no laws for successful theoretical models to approximate, then what is it that successful theories do? One response is to regard theoretical models as tools. But this instrumental reading cannot accommodate the explanatory role that theories are supposed to play. Yet accommodating the explanatory function, as articulated by Brandon and Sober for example, seems to involve us once again in a reliance on laws. The paper concludes that we must rethink both the nature of laws and theoretical explanation in biology|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Nancy Cartwright (1997). Models: The Blueprints for Laws. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):303.
Jani Raerinne (2011). Allometries and Scaling Laws Interpreted as Laws: A Reply to Elgin. Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):99-111.
Lee Mcintyre (1997). Gould on Laws in Biological Science. Biology and Philosophy 12 (3).
Mehmet Elgin (2003). Biology and A Priori Laws. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1380-1389.
Alex Rosenberg (2001). How is Biological Explanation Possible? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):735-760.
Mehmet Elgin (2003). Biology and a Priori Laws. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1380--1389.
Mehmet Elgin (2006). There May Be Strict Empirical Laws in Biology, After All. Biology and Philosophy 21 (1):119-134.
Lane DesAutels (2010). Sober and Elgin on Laws of Biology: A Critique. Biology and Philosophy 25 (2):249-256.
Barbara L. Horan (1988). Theoretical Models, Biological Complexity and the Semantic View of Theories. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:265 - 277.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #89,098 of 556,898 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,931 of 556,898 )
How can I increase my downloads?