Tracking, Reliabilism, And Possible Worlds

Minerva 8:114-131 (2004)
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Abstract

Robert Nozick’s tracking account of knowledge is defended against Colin McGinn’s criticisms bydrawing on David Deutsch’s ’multiverse’ conception of possible worlds. Knowledge on the trackingaccount requires a ’method’ or ’way’ of believing. Exploiting this feature undercuts the apparent force of McGinn’s counter-examples

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