The T-schema is not a logical truth

Analysis 72 (2):231-239 (2012)
It is shown that the logical truth of instances of the T-schema is incompatible with the formal nature of logical truth. In particular, since the formality of logical truth entails that the set of logical truths is closed under substitution, the logical truth of T-schema instances entails that all sentences are logical truths
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ans031
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