What is a truth value and how many are there?

Studia Logica 92 (2):183 - 201 (2009)
Truth values are, properly understood, merely proxies for the various relations that can hold between language and the world. Once truth values are understood in this way, consideration of the Liar paradox and the revenge problem shows that our language is indefinitely extensible, as is the class of truth values that statements of our language can take – in short, there is a proper class of such truth values. As a result, important and unexpected connections emerge between the semantic paradoxes and the set-theoretic paradoxes.
Keywords Absolute Generality  Indefinite Extensibility  Liar Paradox  Revenge Problem  Semantics  Set Theory  Truth Value
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Matti Eklund (2005). What Vagueness Consists In. Philosophical Studies 125 (1):27-60.

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Philippe Schlenker (2010). Super Liars. Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (3):374-414.

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