A realism for Reid: Mediated but direct

It is commonly said of modern philosophy that it introduced a representative theory of perception, a theory that places representative mental items between perceivers and ordinary physical objects. Such a theory, it has been thought, would be a form of indirect realism: we perceive objects only by means of apprehending mental entities that represent them. The moral of the story is that what began with Descartes’s revolution of basing objective truth on subjective certainty ends with Hume’s paroxysms of ambivalence and skepticism in the conclusion of the first book of the..
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DOI 10.1080/0960878042000188856
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Jake Quilty-Dunn (2013). Was Reid a Direct Realist? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2):302 - 323.

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