Deviant encodings and Turing's analysis of computability

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References found in this work BETA
B. Jack Copeland (2008). The Church-Turing Thesis. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Stewart Shapiro (1982). Acceptable Notation. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1):14-20.
Wilfried Sieg (1994). Mechanical Procedures and Mathematical Experience. In Alexander George (ed.), Mathematics and Mind. Oxford University Press. 71--117.

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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Rescorla (2012). Copeland and Proudfoot on Computability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):199-202.
Similar books and articles
Michael Rescorla (2012). Copeland and Proudfoot on Computability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):199-202.
Robert I. Soare (1996). Computability and Recursion. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):284-321.
Jack Copeland (1999). Beyond the Universal Turing Machine. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):46-67.
W. Sieg (2006). Godel on Computability. Philosophia Mathematica 14 (2):189-207.
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