Reid on consciousness: Hop, hot or for?

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):613-634 (2007)
Abstract
Thomas Reid claims to share Locke's view that consciousness is a kind of inner sense. This is puzzling, given the role the inner-sense theory plays in indirect realism and in the theory of ideas generally. I argue that Reid does not in fact hold an inner-sense theory of consciousness and that his view differs importantly from contemporary higher-order theories of consciousness. For Reid, consciousness is a first-order representational process in which a mental state with a particular content suggests the application of recognitional concepts in forming beliefs or judgements to the effect that one is currently undergoing a state with that content. I take up the question of whether Reid's theory leads to a regress, and I argue that while the regress cannot be eliminated, it is mitigated by the non-hierarchical nature of Reid's theory of mind
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    References found in this work BETA
    Ned Block (1995). How Many Concepts of Consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272.
    Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Todd Buras (2005). The Nature of Sensations in Reid. History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (3):221 - 238.
    Rebecca Copenhaver (2004). A Realism for Reid: Mediated but Direct. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (1):61 – 74.

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