Thomas Reid's philosophy of mind: Consciousness and intentionality

Philosophy Compass 1 (3):279-289 (2006)
Thomas Reid’s epistemological ambitions are decisively at the center of his work. However, if we take such ambitions to be the whole story, we are apt to overlook the theory of mind that Reid develops and deploys against the theory of ideas. Reid’s philosophy of mind is sophisticated and strikingly contemporary, and has, until recently, been lost in the shadow of his other philosophical accomplishments. Here I survey some aspects of Reid’s theory of mind that I find most interesting. I examine whether Reid is a mysterian about the mind, whether Reid has a direct realist theory of perception, and whether Reid has a higher-order, or “inner-sense,” view of consciousness. Along the way I will mention portions of the secondary literature that examine these aspects and point out whether and to what degree I part ways with the interpretations present in the literature
Keywords Consciousness  Epistemology  Idea  Intentionality  Mind  Perception  Reid, Thomas
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00023.x
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Reid (2007). An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell Pub. Ltd.

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