David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 108 (3):335-59 (1996)
To compute is to execute an algorithm. More precisely, to say that a device or organ computes is to say that there exists a modelling relationship of a certain kind between it and a formal specification of an algorithm and supporting architecture. The key issue is to delimit the phrase of a certain kind. I call this the problem of distinguishing between standard and nonstandard models of computation. The successful drawing of this distinction guards Turing's 1936 analysis of computation against a difficulty that has persistently been raised against it, and undercuts various objections that have been made to the computational theory of mind
|Keywords||Algorithm Computation Metaphysics Model Searle, J Turing, A|
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W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Gualtiero Piccinini (2008). Computation Without Representation. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
Robert J. Matthews & Eli Dresner (2016). Measurement and Computational Skepticism. Noûs 50 (1):n/a-n/a.
Nir Fresco (2012). The Explanatory Role of Computation in Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 22 (4):353-380.
Nir Fresco (2010). Explaining Computation Without Semantics: Keeping It Simple. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (2):165-181.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2010). The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.
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