Apriority and Logical Constancy

Abstract Peacocke proposes a criterion for logical constancy in terms of a priori knowability conditions. An a priori knowability condition, Peacocke claims, meets a condition of adequacy for any criterion of logical constancy: expressions satisfying the criterion are topic-neutral. I’ll raise the objection that certain a posteriori knowability conditions would satisfy this adequacy condition. For the requirement of topic-neutrality is ambiguous between two conceptions. Under one conception, a truth is topic-neutral if it is characterized by its indifference to all worldly facts or its abstraction from all semantic content whatsoever. According to another conception of topic-neutrality, to claim that a truth is topic-neutral is not to characterize it by its abstraction from all content whatsoever but rather to characterize it by its abstraction from the specific identities of things. A posteriori knowability conditions could yield expressions which are topic-neutral in this second sense, and so a priori knowability conditions are unnecessary to yield expressions which are topic-neutral in some sense or other.
Keywords apriority  logical consequence
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