Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects

"Nowadays, a need for formal tools is strongly felt in the treatment of two special areas of ontological inquiry. One area is concerned with intentional objects, an area which seems to contain difficulties on the level of things, but also on the level of states of affairs, facts and other "propositional" entities. An intentional relation holds between either persons (more generally experiencing subjects) or acts of consciousness on the one hand, and the intentional objects on the other. The latter are what people see, fear, expect, look for; and the problem, naturally, consists in the fact that – contrary to..
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Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2008). Varieties of Intentional Objects. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17 (194):23-32.
David W. Smith (1975). Meinongian Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 1:43-71.
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Daniel Hunter (1981). Reference and Meinongian Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 14:23-36.

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