Online research in philosophy

In attempts to come to grips with Kant’s thought, the influence of the philosophy of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) is often neglected. In this paper, I consider three topics in Kant’s philosophy of mind, broadly construed, where Wolff’s influence is particularly visible: consciousness, self-consciousness, and psychology. I argue that we can better understand Kant’s particular arguments and positions within this context, but also gain a more accurate sense of which aspects of Kant’s accounts derive from the antecedent traditions and which constitute genuine philosophical innovations.

This paper constitutes one extended argument, which touches on various topics of Critical Rationalism as it was initiated by Karl Popper and further developed (although into different directions) in his aftermath. The result of the argument will be that critical rationalism either offers no solution to the problem of induction at all , or that it amounts, in the last resort, to a kind of Critical Rationalist Inductivism as it were, a version of what I call Good Old Induction. One may think of David Miller as a contemporary representative of what I consider as the ‘no solution’ version of critical rationalism, while Alan Musgrave stands for the version of ‘critical rationalist induction’. Popper’s own writings admit of either interpretation.

Although other scholars have pointed out why reading Kant as a compatibilist is superior to interpreting him as a libertarian incompatibilist, the infancy of his unique compatibilism has not been amply addressed. Here I marshal evidence from Kant’s pre-critical works (specifically the Nova Dilucidatio, the Inaugural Dissertation, and “An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism”) to demonstrate that what the pre-critical Kant calls ‘freedom’ is consistent with what Kant will later call ‘autonomy.’ Once a pre-critical version of autonomy is acknowledged, one will see that both the positive and negative formulations of freedom that pervade the critical philosophy are latent in the pre-critical period.

Christian Wolff's 1721 "Discourse on the Practical Philosophy of the Chinese" is generally read as championing the autonomy of ethics from religion. This is too simple: Wolff's ethics was an antivoluntarist "religious" ethics. The example of the Chinese confirmed for Wolff that revelation is not necessary for knowledge or practice of genuine virtue, though he held that the Chinese achieve only the first of three "degrees of virtue." (Most Christians, including the Pietists who drove Wolff from Halle shortly after he delivered the "Discourse," did not, in his judgment, achieve even that.) China's being perceived as outside of Western (and sacred) history made it a congenial example for the ethics and moral anthropology that, in Wolff's time, were struggling against the voluntarism of a Christian ethics premised on original sin.

Foreword I. Critical rationalism is a genuinely new philosophical perspective. It is not, however, one systematic view. The development of it by Popper and ...

This paper considers Kant's conception of force and causality in his early pre-Critical writings, arguing that this conception is best understood by way of contrast with his immediate predecessors, such as Christian Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, Georg Friedrich Meier, Martin Knutzen, and Christian August Crusius, and in terms of the scientific context of natural philosophy at the time. Accordingly, in the True estimation Kant conceives of force in terms of activity rather than in terms of specific effects, such as motion (as unnamed Wolffians had done). Kant's explicit arguments in the Nova dilucidatio for physical influx (in the guise of the principle of succession) are directed primarily against the conception of grounds and existence held by Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier, and only secondarily against Leibniz (by asserting the priority of bodies over mind rather than vice versa). Finally, Kant's reconciliation of the infinite divisibility of space and the unity of monads in the Physical monadology is designed to respond to objections that could be raised naturally by Wolff and Baumgarten.