Husserl on foundation

Dialectica 58 (3):349–367 (2004)
In the third of his Logical Investigations, Husserl draws an important distinction between two kinds of parts: the dependent parts like the redness of a visual datum or the squareness of a given picture, and the independent parts like the head of a horse or a brick in a wall. On his view, the distinction is to be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion, the notion of foundation. This paper is an attempt at clarifying that notion. Such attempts have already been undertaken by Peter Simons and Kit Fine, and the paper also contains elements of comparison of our three sets of views
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00310.x
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References found in this work BETA
Kit Fine (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
Kit Fine (1995). 10 Part-Whole. In Barry Smith & David Woodruff Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Cambridge University Press 463.

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Citations of this work BETA
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
Fabrice Correia (2008). Ontological Dependence. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1013-1032.

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