David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
History and Philosophy of Logic (forthcoming)
Much of the last fifty years of scholarship on Aristotle’s syllogistic suggests a conceptual framework under which the syllogistic is a logic, a system of inferential reasoning, only if it is not a theory or formal ontology, a system concerned with general features of the world. In this paper, I will argue that this a misleading interpretative framework. The syllogistic is something sui generis: by our lights, it is neither clearly a logic, nor clearly a theory, but rather exhibits certain characteristic marks of logics and certain characteristic marks of theories. In what follows, I will present a debate between a theoretical and a logical interpretation of the syllogistic. The debate centers on the interpretation of syllogisms as either implications or inferences. But the significance of this question has been taken to concern the nature and subject-matter of the syllogistic, and how it ought to be represented by modern techniques. For one might think that, if syllogisms are implications, propositions with conditional form, then the syllogistic, in so far as it is a systematic taxonomy of syllogisms, is a theory or a body of knowledge concerned with general features of the world. Furthermore, if the syllogistic is a theory, then it ought to be represented by an axiomatic system, a system deriving propositional theorems from axioms. On the other hand, if syllogisms are inferences, then the syllogistic is a logic, a system of inferential reasoning. And furthermore, it ought to be represented as a natural deduction system, a system deriving valid arguments by means of intuitively valid inferences. I will argue that one can disentangle these questions—are syllogisms inferences or implications, is the syllogistic a logic or a theory, is the syllogistic a body of worldly knowledge or a system of inferential reasoning, and ought we to represent the syllogistic as a natural deduction system or an axiomatic system—and that we must if we are to have a historically accurate understanding of Aristotle.
|Keywords||syllogistic logic aristotle|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Edgar Jose Andrade & Edward Samuel Becerra (2008). Establishing Connections Between Aristotle's Natural Deduction and First-Order Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (4):309-325.
Marko Malink (2006). A Reconstruction of Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic. History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (2):95-141.
Susanne Bobzien (1996). Stoic Syllogistic. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 14:133-92.
Fred Johnson (1994). Syllogisms with Fractional Quantifiers. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (4):401 - 422.
Philip L. Peterson (1991). Complexly Fractionated Syllogistic Quantifiers. Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (3):287 - 313.
Susanne Bobzien (1999). Logic: The Stoics (Part Two). In Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes & et al (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. CUP.
Enrique Alvarez & Manuel Correia (2012). Syllogistic with Indefinite Terms. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (4):297-306.
Dwayne Raymond (2011). Polarity and Inseparability: The Foundation of the Apodictic Portion of Aristotle's Modal Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (3):193-218.
Richard Patterson (1990). Conversion Principles and the Basis of Aristotle's Modal Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 11 (2):151-172.
S. N. Furs (1987). Computation of Aristotle's and Gergonne's Syllogisms. Studia Logica 46 (3):209 - 225.
Bart Geurts (2003). Reasoning with Quantifiers. Cognition 86 (3):223--251.
John N. Martin (2001). Proclus and the Neoplatonic Syllogistic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (3):187-240.
Don Emil Herget (1987). Non-Standard Categorical Syllogisms: Four That Leibniz Forgot. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (1):1-13.
Added to index2011-02-24
Total downloads92 ( #12,191 of 1,096,624 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #51,759 of 1,096,624 )
How can I increase my downloads?