Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles: A false principle

Philosophy of Science 43 (4):491-505 (1976)
In considering the possibility that the fundamental particles of matter might violate Leibniz's Principle, one is confronted with logical proofs that the Principle is a Theorem of Logic. This paper shows that the proof of that theorem is not universal enough to encompass entities that might not be unique, and also strongly suggests that photons, for example, do violate Leibniz's Principle. It also shows that the existence of non-individuals would imply the breakdown of Quine's criterion of ontological commitment.
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DOI 10.1086/288707
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F. A. Muller & Simon Saunders (2008). Discerning Fermions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):499-548.
Cord Friebe (2014). Individuality, Distinguishability, and Entanglement: A Defense of Leibniz׳s Principle. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 48:89-98.

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