Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy 78 (2):279-287 (2003)
|Abstract||This paper is an elaboration of my previous paper published in Philosophy, ‘Making Sense of retributivism,’ which was a criticism of John Rawls' attempt in ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ to develop a rule utilitarian theory of punishment wherein utilitarianism is best construed as a justificatory basis for the institution of punishment and retributivism is best construed as serving as a justificatory basis for particular forms of punishment. I challenge this claim, arguing that retributivism must and can provide a justification both for the institution of punishment and for particular forms of punishment. In the end, I develop an analysis of the nature of desert as responsibility and proportionality. This notion of desert makes the best sense of retributivism.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Thom Brooks (2005). Kantian Punishment and Retributivism: A Reply to Clark. Ratio 18 (2):237–245.
Thom Brooks (2004). Retributivist Arguments Against Capital Punishment. Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (2):188–197.
Benjamin Vilhauer (2013). Persons, Punishment, and Free Will Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):143-163.
Larry Alexander (1983). Retributivism and the Inadvertent Punishment of the Innocent. Law and Philosophy 2 (2):233 - 246.
Leo Zaibert (2006). The Fitting, the Deserving, and the Beautiful. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (3):331-350.
Nathan Hanna (2008). Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism. Law and Philosophy 27 (2):123-150.
Howard Simmons (2010). Moral Desert: A Critique. University Press of America.
D. Dolinko (1997). Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment. Law and Philosophy 16 (5):507-528.
George Schedler (2011). Retributivism and Fallible Systems of Punishment. Criminal Justice Ethics 30 (3):240-266.
J. Angelo Corlett (2001). Making Sense of Retributivism. Philosophy 76 (1):77-110.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads53 ( #23,154 of 739,324 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,324 )
How can I increase my downloads?