Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations
Theoria 19 (2):155-172 (2004)
| Abstract | Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both David Lewis’ dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard’s procedural realism | |||||||||
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