Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations

Theoria 19 (2):155-172 (2004)
Abstract
Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both David Lewis’ dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard’s procedural realism
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 12,068
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Don Loeb (2005). Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):193–208.
Joseph Millum (2008). A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):385-407.
Stefan Sencerz (1995). Personal Goodness and Moral Facts. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:481-498.
Charles Sayward (1989). Do Moral Explanations Matter? Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.
Mark T. Nelson (2006). Moral Realism and Program Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):417 – 428.
Boran Berčić (2006). Devitt on Moral Realism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):63-68.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

8 ( #179,019 of 1,101,838 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #191,964 of 1,101,838 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.