Observation, Character, and A Purely First-Person Point of View
Acta Analytica 26 (4):311-328 (2011)
| Abstract | In Values and the Reflective Point of View (2006), Robert Dunn defends a certain expressivist view about evaluative beliefs from which some implications about self-knowledge are explicitly derived. He thus distinguishes between an observational and a deliberative attitude towards oneself, so that the latter involves a purely first-person point of view that gives rise to an especially authoritative, but wholly non-observational, kind of self-knowledge. Even though I sympathize with many aspects of Dunn's approach to evaluative beliefs and also with his stress on the practical significance of self-knowledge, I argue that his proposal seriously misinterprets the role of observation and evidence within the first-person point of view and, derivatively, in the formation of evaluative beliefs | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJosep Corbà (2011). Observation, Character, and A Purely First-Person Point of View. Acta Analytica 26 (4):311-328.
Robert Francescotti (1993). Subjective Experience and Points of View. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.
Bert Hamminga (2005). Language, Reality and Truth: The African Point of View. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 88 (1):85-116.
Susan Wolf (1999). Morality and the View From Here. Journal of Ethics 3 (3):203-223.
Alan Thomas (2005). Reasonable Partiality and the Agent's Point of View. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):25 - 43.
Gülriz Uygur (2008). The Relationship Between Law and Morality From the Internal Point of View. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 40:177-183.
Sarah K. Paul (2009). How We Know What We're Doing. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (11).
James Rachels (1972). Evaluating From a Point of View. Journal of Value Inquiry 6 (2):144-157.
Amie L. Thomasson (2005). First-Person Knowledge in Phenomenology. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Robert Dunn (1998). Knowing What I'm About to Do Without Evidence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):231 – 252.
Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Externalism and First-Person Authority. Synthese 104 (1):99-122.
Pierre Vermersch (2004). Attention Between Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology. Continental Philosophy Review 37 (1):45-81.
Joe Cruz & John Pollock (2004). The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
Rik Peels (2012). The New View on Ignorance Undefeated. Philosophia 40 (4):741-750.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-05-14Total downloads21 ( #58,746 of 549,088 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,088 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
