Subjetividad y valor en un mundo natural

Teorema 17 (2):25-44 (1998)
Abstract
I discuss, in this paper, the view of value that is associated with Humean motivational theories. I argue that these theories unjustifiably constrain the kind of element that may contribute to our motivational economy and, thereby, unduly reduce our capacity to recognize certain sources of value. To this purpose, I will examine some axiological experiences that, if I am right, are inaccessible to a Humean analysis of our motivational structure. I will insist, for instance, on a sense in which social links may be important in the life of a human being which the Humean notion of desire cannot apprehend.
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