The Absence of Multiple Universes of Discourse in the 1936 Tarski Consequence-Definition Paper

History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (4):359 - 374 (2011)
Abstract This paper discusses the history of the confusion and controversies over whether the definition of consequence presented in the 11-page 1936 Tarski consequence-definition paper is based on a monistic fixed-universe framework?like Begriffsschrift and Principia Mathematica. Monistic fixed-universe frameworks, common in pre-WWII logic, keep the range of the individual variables fixed as ?the class of all individuals?. The contrary alternative is that the definition is predicated on a pluralistic multiple-universe framework?like the 1931 Gödel incompleteness paper. A pluralistic multiple-universe framework recognizes multiple universes of discourse serving as different ranges of the individual variables in different interpretations?as in post-WWII model theory. In the early 1960s, many logicians?mistakenly, as we show?held the ?contrary alternative? that Tarski 1936 had already adopted a Gödel-type, pluralistic, multiple-universe framework. We explain that Tarski had not yet shifted out of the monistic, Frege?Russell, fixed-universe paradigm. We further argue that between his Principia-influenced pre-WWII Warsaw period and his model-theoretic post-WWII Berkeley period, Tarski's philosophy underwent many other radical changes
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified (fix it)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Timothy Bays (2001). On Tarski on Models. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (4):1701-1726.
    Greg Ray (1996). Logical Consequence: A Defense of Tarski. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (6):617 - 677.
    Dirk Greimann (1997). Die Idee Hinter Tarskis Definition Von Wahrheit. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 28 (1):121-158.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-09-10

    Total downloads

    36 ( #33,011 of 549,088 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    20 ( #2,820 of 549,088 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums