Getting seriously vague: Comments on Donald Borrett, Sean Kelly and Hon Kwan's modelling of the primordial
Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):229 – 232 (2000)
|Abstract||Drawing upon the work of Merleau-Ponty, Borrett et al. (2000) have attempted to model the primordial, "empty heads turned towards the world." Putting the issue of embodiment aside for another day, they propose two separate models, one of movement and the other of perception. While I am sympathetic to the point of their project, I argue in this commentary that their models are insufficiently vague. The following analytic abstractions to which they commit themselves seem seriously at odds with the nature of their task: action versus perception; vision versus the other senses; spatial properties versus, for example, colour and meaning; and 'a controller' versus the body and its environment.|
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