Asian Philosophy 19 (3):239-264 (2009)
|Abstract||In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of _svasavitti_ ('self-awareness', 'self-cognition') following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. Second, I argue against a foundationalist reading of the causal account of perception offered by Dignga and Dharmakīrti. Finally, I argue that it is possible to read Dignga's (and following him Dharmakīrti's) treatment of _svasamvitti_ as offering something like a phenomenological account of embodied self-awareness|
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