Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach

Asian Philosophy 19 (3):239-264 (2009)
In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of _svasa(m)dotvitti_ ('self-awareness', 'self-cognition') following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. Second, I argue against a foundationalist reading of the causal account of perception offered by Dignamacrga and Dharmakīrti. Finally, I argue that it is possible to read Dignamacrga's (and following him Dharmakīrti's) treatment of _svasamvitti_ as offering something like a phenomenological account of embodied self-awareness
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References found in this work BETA
Laurence Bonjour (1994). Against Naturalized Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):283-300.

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