Pragmatic truth and the logic of induction

We apply the recently elaborated notions of ‘pragmatic truth’ and ‘pragmatic probability’ to the problem of the construction of a logic of inductive inference. It is argued that the system outlined here is able to overcome many of the objections usually levelled against such attempts. We claim, furthermore, that our view captures the essentially cumulative nature of science and allows us to explain why it is indeed reasonable to accept and believe in the conclusions reached by inductive inference.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/40.3.333
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Steven French & James Ladyman (1999). Reinflating the Semantic Approach. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):103 – 121.
Newton C. A. da Costa & Steven French (1993). A Model Theoretic Approach to 'Natural' Reasoning. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):177-190.

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