Two notions of epistemic validity
Synthese 109 (2):217 - 262 (1996)
| Abstract | How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in (Ramsey 1990).(RT) If A, then B must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B. | |||||||||
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David Barnett (2008). Ramsey + Moore != God. Analysis 68 (2):168-174.
John N. Williams (2012). Moore-Paradoxical Belief, Conscious Belief and the Epistemic Ramsey Test. Synthese 188 (2):231-246.
Enrico Martino (2006). Fictional Propositions and the Unprovability of Consistency. Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):201-210.
Horacio L. Arlo Costa (1990). Conditionals and Monotonic Belief Revisions: The Success Postulate. Studia Logica 49 (4):557 - 566.
David J. Chalmers & Alan Hájek (2007). Ramsey + Moore = God. Analysis 67 (294):170–172.
Peter Gärdenfors, Sten Lindström, Michael Morreau & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1991). The Negative Ramsey Test. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer.
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