Tertium datur? Reflections on Owen Flanagan's consciousness reconsidered

Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):85-103 (1995)
Owen Flanagan's arguments concerning qualia constitute an intermediate position between Dennett's “disqualification” of qualia and the thesis that qualia represent an insurmountable obstacle to constructive naturalism. This middle ground is potentially attractive, but it is shown to have serious problems. This is brought out via consideration of several classic areas of dispute connected with qualia, including the inverted spectrum, Frank Jackson's thought experiment, Hindsight, and epiphenomenalism. An attempt is made to formulate the basis for a less vulnerable variant on the “middle ground”
Keywords Consciousness  Naturalism  Psychology  Qualia  Science  Dennett, D  Flanagan, O
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089508573146
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,914
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Jason Holt (1999). Blindsight in Debates About Qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (5):54-71.
Keith Frankish (2012). Quining Diet Qualia. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):667-676.
David de Leon (2001). The Qualities of Qualia. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1):121-138.
Owen J. Flanagan (1985). Consciousness, Naturalism and Nagel. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6 (3):373-90.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

14 ( #180,385 of 1,725,584 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #211,030 of 1,725,584 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.