Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):85-103 (1995)
|Abstract||Owen Flanagan's arguments concerning qualia constitute an intermediate position between Dennett's “disqualification” of qualia and the thesis that qualia represent an insurmountable obstacle to constructive naturalism. This middle ground is potentially attractive, but it is shown to have serious problems. This is brought out via consideration of several classic areas of dispute connected with qualia, including the inverted spectrum, Frank Jackson's thought experiment, Hindsight, and epiphenomenalism. An attempt is made to formulate the basis for a less vulnerable variant on the “middle ground”|
|Keywords||Consciousness Naturalism Psychology Qualia Science Dennett, D Flanagan, O|
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