Tertium datur? Reflections on Owen Flanagan's consciousness reconsidered

Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):85-103 (1995)
Abstract
Owen Flanagan's arguments concerning qualia constitute an intermediate position between Dennett's “disqualification” of qualia and the thesis that qualia represent an insurmountable obstacle to constructive naturalism. This middle ground is potentially attractive, but it is shown to have serious problems. This is brought out via consideration of several classic areas of dispute connected with qualia, including the inverted spectrum, Frank Jackson's thought experiment, Hindsight, and epiphenomenalism. An attempt is made to formulate the basis for a less vulnerable variant on the “middle ground”
Keywords Consciousness  Naturalism  Psychology  Qualia  Science  Dennett, D  Flanagan, O
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