Discussion: A defense of Bechtel and Mundale

Philosophy of Science 71 (2):198-204 (2004)
Abstract
Kim claims that Bechtel and Mundale's case against multiple realization depends on the wrong kind of evidence. The latter argue that neuroscientific practice shows neural states across individuals and species are type identical. Kim replies that the evidence they cite to support this is irrelevant. I defend Bechtel and Mundale by showing why the evidence they cite is relevant and shows multiple realization does not occur.
Keywords Mental States  Multiple  Neuroscience  Realization  Science  Bechtel, W  Kim, J  Mundale, J
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