Philosophy of Science 55 (3):415-421 (1988)
|Abstract||In this paper, I will defend Paul Feyerabend's claim--that there are some scientific theories that cannot be refuted unless one of their rivals is first confirmed--by criticizing Ronald Laymon's well-known attack on Feyerabend's claim. In particular, I will argue both that the Second Law of Thermodynamics was not refuted before the Kinetic Theory's predictions were confirmed, and that it could not have been refuted without the confirmation of the remarkable predictions of some rival theory|
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