Some Doubts about Knowledge
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 36:255 - 272 (1935)
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Sten Olaf Welding (2005). Kann Es Ein Argument für den Skeptizismus Geben? Das Epistemische Problem der Irrtumsmöglichkeit. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (1):107 - 118.
Ernest Sosa (2010). Value Matters in Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy 107 (4):167-190.
Ruth Weintraub (1991). Epistemology Without Knowledge? Ratio 4 (2):157-169.
Baron Reed (2006). Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism About Common Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):186–197.
Linton Wang & Wei-Fen Ma (2012). Scientific Knowledge and Extended Epistemic Virtues. Erkenntnis 77 (2):273-295.
Gisela Striker (2001). Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (2):113-129.
Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley (2005). I-Paper by Jennifer Hornsby. Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):107–130.
Roy Ellen (1998). Doubts About a Unified Cognitive Theory of Taxonomic Knowledge and its Memic Status. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):572-573.
Michael Williams (1991). Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. B. Blackwell.
Josefa Toribio (2008). How Do We Know How? Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):39 – 52.
T. W. Hutchison (1999). 'Ultra-Deductivism', Perfect Knowledge and the Methodology of Economics: Some Lingering Doubts. Journal of Economic Methodology 6 (1):131-132.
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