David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 251 (September):251-272 (1990)
A range of arguments are presented to demonstrate that (1) human visual orientations are conceptually constituted (concept?bound); (2) the concept?boundedness of visual orientations does not require a cognitivist account according to which a mental process of ?inference? or of ?interpretation? must be postulated to accompany a purely ?optical? registration of ?wavelengths of light?, ?photons?, or contentless ?information'; (3) concept?bound visual orientations are not all instances of ?seeing as?, contrary to some currently prominent cognitivist accounts; (4) the dispute between cognitivist and realist accounts about the phenomenon of ?seeing as? is spurious, and is based upon a confusion about the fundamental analytical distinction made by Wittgenstein between ?seeing? and ?seeing as'; (5) ?perceiving?, ?seeing?, and ?seeing as? are but three of a large array of verbs of human visual orientation, and are not ?master categories? under which one can subsume these other modalities; (6) one cannot deduce a continuity of human visual orientation from a continuity of photon?photoreceptor interaction, a point we characterize as the ?staggered character? of human visual orientations; (7) detailed attention to the grammars of the diverse verbs of human visual orientation can open up a domain of study which we here refer to as a ?praxiology of perception'; (8) the nature of such an inquiry can be illustrated with exemplary reference to the analysis of the properties of ?noticing? as embedded in courses of practical action; and (9) such arguments, which claim that existing perceptual theories overly homogenize what is involved in visual orientations to the world, parallel those of Stroll, who proposes that standard accounts of ?what is perceived? overly homogenize the perceptible environment
|Keywords||Concept Epistemology Perception Praxiology Visual Gibson, J|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1981). How Direct is Visual Perception? Some Reflections on Gibson's 'Ecological Approach'. Cognition 9 (2):139-96.
J. L. Austin (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford University Press.
Michael T. Turvey, R. E. Shaw, Edward S. Reed & William M. Mace (1981). Ecological Laws of Perceiving and Acting: In Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. Cognition 9 (3):237-304.
Jeff Coulter (1983). Rethinking Cognitive Theory. St. Martin's Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Louis Quéré (2012). Is There Any Good Reason to Say Goodbye to “Ethnomethodology”? Human Studies 35 (2):305-325.
Dušan I. Bjelić (1995). An Ethnomethodological Clarification of Husserl's Concepts of “Regressive Inquiry” and “Galilean Physics” by Means of Discovering Praxioms. Human Studies 18 (2-3):189-225.
William Noble (1993). Meaning and the “Discursive Ecology”: Further to the Debate on Ecological Perceptual Theory. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (4):375-398.
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