Locke on consciousness

History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):221-242 (2008)
Locke’s theory of consciousness is often appropriated as a forerunner of present-day Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories, but not much is said about it beyond that. We offer an interpretation of Locke’s account of consciousness that portrays it as crucially different from current-day HOP theory, both in detail and in spirit. In this paper, it is argued that there are good historical and philosophical reasons to attribute to Locke the view not that conscious states are accompanied by higher-order perceptions, but rather that conscious states constitute perceptions of themselves.
Keywords Locke  Consciousness  Same-Order
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DOI 10.2307/27745128
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Gordon-Roth Jessica (2015). Locke on the Ontology of Persons. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):97-123.
Galen Strawson (2015). Self-Intimation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
Shelley Weinberg (2015). Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):n/a-n/a.

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