David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409 (2012)
Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb ‘intentionally’. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb ‘intentionally’ has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications of our account for folk psychology
|Keywords||Experimental Philosophy Action Theory Intentional Action Moral Psychology Semantics|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
John R. Searle (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis 63 (3):190–194.
Joshua Knobe (2010). Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
Citations of this work BETA
Paulo Sousa & Carlos Mauro (2013). The Evaluative Nature of the Folk Concepts of Weakness and Strength of Will. Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):487-509.
Hanno Sauer (2014). It’s the Knobe Effect, Stupid! Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):485-503.
Kate Falkenstien (2013). Explaining the Effect of Morality on Intentionality of Lucky Actions: The Role of Underlying Questions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):293-308.
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