On Doing Things Intentionally

Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409 (2012)
Abstract
Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb ‘intentionally’. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb ‘intentionally’ has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications of our account for folk psychology
Keywords Experimental Philosophy  Action Theory  Intentional Action  Moral Psychology  Semantics
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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Similar books and articles
Jason Turner (2004). Folk Intuitions, Asymmetry, and Intentional Side Effects. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):214-219.
Thomas Nadelhoffer (2004). Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):259-269.
Julie Yoo (2004). Folk Psychology and Moral Evaluation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):237-251.
Eric Wiland (2007). Intentional Action and "in Order To". Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.
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