Law and Philosophy 21 (3):275-304 (2002)
|Abstract||An underpinning assumption of modern legal positivism is that the question of how legal standards differ from normative standards in other spheres of human thought is resolved via the concept of a legal system and the notion of internal logic, through use of contextual definition. This approach is seen to lead to an untenable form of structuralism altogether at odds with the positivist's intentions. An alternative strategy is offered which allows the positivists to retain their deepest insights, though at a price.|
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