Epistemic truth and excluded middle

Theoria 64 (2-3):243-282 (1998)
Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.1998.tb00189.x
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References found in this work BETA
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Michael Dummett (1959). Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.

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