David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topoi 31 (1):59-66 (2012)
What is the role of a notion of truth in our form of life? What is it to possess a notion of truth? How different would we be, if we did not possess a notion of truth? Gulliver’s description of three peoples encountered during his fifth travel will help me to answer. One might say that the basic anti-realist tenet is that we should explain the notion of truth by connecting it with our practice of assertion. In this sense the outcome of my commentary of the fifth part of Gulliver’s Travels will amount to a non-reductive anti-realist conception of truth. It can be called a dialectical conception of truth because it focuses on a particular way of resolving disagreements: an epistemically virtuous practice of verbal exchange that cares for truth. The main thesis is that an implicit awareness of the epistemically virtuous practice is a necessary condition for being in full possession of the notion of truth. The commentary will also involve an argument against deflationism and a critique of some claims made by Huw Price
|Keywords||Epistemic-virtues Disagreement Norms of assertion Caring for truth Deflationism|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael A. E. Dummett (1991). The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University Press.
Paul Horwich (1996). Realism Minus Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):877-881.
Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.
Michael Lynch (2004). True to Life: Why Truth Matters. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Huw Price (2010). Truth as Convenient Friction. In Mario de Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. Columbia University Press 167--190.
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