Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Gilbert Harman has written: “Williamson‟s Knowledge and its Limits is the most important philosophical discussion of knowledge in many years. It sets the agenda for epistemology for the next decade and beyond” (Harman 2002, p. 417). Timothy Williamson‟s ground-breaking proposal is that knowing is “merely a state of mind”. In other words, for every proposition p “there is a state of mind being in which is necessary and sufficient for knowing p” (Williamson 2000, p. 21). When first advanced, Williamson‟s view ran contrary to the general trend. The “standard view” (ibidem) was that “believing is merely a state of mind, but..|
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