Philosophical Studies 161 (2):309-325 (2012)
|Abstract||This paper presents and defends an account of the coincidence of biological organisms with mereological sums of their material components. That is, an organism and the sum of its material components are distinct material objects existing in the same place at the same time. Instead of relying on historical or modal differences to show how such coincident entities are distinct, this paper argues that there is a class of physiological properties of biological organisms that their coincident mereological sums do not have. The account answers some of the most pressing objections to coincidence, for example the so-called grounding problem , that material coincidence seems to require that coinciding objects have modal differences that do not supervene on any other properties.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Theodore Sider (2008). Yet Another Paper on the Supervenience Argument Against Coincident Entities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):613-624.
Mark Moyer (2006). Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence? Synthese 148 (2):401 - 423.
Eric T. Olson (2001). Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):337-355.
Gabriel Uzquiano (2011). Mereological Harmony. In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
E. J. Lowe (2002). Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: A Response to Olson. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):369-372.
Paul Needham (2010). Transient Things and Permanent Stuff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):147 – 166.
Gabriel Uzquiano (forthcoming). Mereology and Modality. In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press.
Berit Brogaard (2004). Species as Individuals. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):223-242.
Peter van Inwagen (2006). Can Mereological Sums Change Their Parts? Journal of Philosophy 103 (12):614-630.
Barbro Björkman (2007). Different Types—Different Rights. Science and Engineering Ethics 13 (2).
Cody Gilmore (forthcoming). Building Enduring Objects Out of Spacetime. In Claudio Calosi & Pierlugi Graziani (eds.), Mereology and the Sciences. Springer.
Mariusz Grygianiec (2005). W obronie mereologicznego esencjalizmu. Filozofia Nauki 3.
Added to index2011-05-24
Total downloads62 ( #15,135 of 549,113 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,390 of 549,113 )
How can I increase my downloads?