David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. OUP Oxford (2010)
This paper is a defence of Terence Horgan’s claim that any genuinely physicalist position must distinguish itself from emergentism. I argue that physicalism is necessarily reductive in character -- it must either give a reductive account of apparently non-physical entities, or a reductive explanation of why there are non-physical entities. I argue that many recent ‘nonreductive’ physicalists do not do this, and that because of this they cannot adequately distinguish their view from emergentism. The conclusion is that this is the real challenge posed by Joseph Levine’s ‘explanatory gap’ argument: if physicalists cannot close the explanatory gap in Levine’s preferred way, they must find some other way to do it. Otherwise their view is indistinguishable from emergentism
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Tim Crane (2001). The Significance of Emergence. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press
Nicholas Schroeder (2015). A Physicalistic Account of Emergentism. Axiomathes 25 (4):479-494.
Neil Campbell (2009). Why We Should Lower Our Expectations About the Explanatory Gap. Theoria 75 (1):34-51.
Jason Megill (2013). A Defense of Emergence. Axiomathes 23 (4):597-615.
Jessica M. Wilson (2010). Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom. British Journal for Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.
Kevin Morris (2014). Supervenience Physicalism, Emergentism, and the Polluted Supervenience Base. Erkenntnis 79 (2):351-365.
Paul Raymont (1999). An Idle Threat: Epiphenomenalism Exposed. Dissertation, University of Toronto
Barbara Montero (2003). The Epistemic/Ontic Divide. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):404-418.
Jared Bates (2009). A Defence of the Explanatory Argument for Physicalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):315-324.
Barbara Montero (2003). The Epistemic/Ontic Divide. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):404 - 418.
James Blachowicz (2013). The Constraint Interpretation of Physical Emergence. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):21-40.
Eugen Zeleňák (2009). On Explanatory Relata in Singular Causal Explanation. Theoria 75 (3):179-195.
Tim Crane (2000). Dualism, Monism, Physicalism. Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85.
Olivier Sartenaer (forthcoming). Sixteen Years Later: Making Sense of Emergence (Again). Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-25.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads204 ( #8,632 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #99,332 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?